Below is an interesting report on the future of Sudan, whether it is retained or the South decides to go. The pictures depicted in those scenarios are extremely gloomy, for both options. You can access the report on www.uip.org
Scenarios for Sudan’s Future,
Revisited
Summary
Many of the post-referendum scenarios in Sudan envisioned by the U.S. Institute of Peace and Clingendael Institute one year ago remain plausible today, less than six months prior to the referendum.
While recent progress on post-referendum arrangements is encouraging, a return to a North-
South civil war is possible, and there is reason to be concerned about the stability of both
states if the outcome of the referendum is secession.
As the referendum approaches, it will be important for the South to develop a stronger sense
of cohesion and common purpose given the uncertain and unprecedented environment
following the vote.
Productively engaging the opposition (armed and unarmed), incorporating marginalized
ethnic and tribal groups into power structures, decentralizing authority, more equitably sharing
resources, and refraining from supporting armed opposition against rivals are important
principles for both parties to adhere to in any recipe for peace and stability.
Sudan is less than six months away from a seminal event: the referendum on whether Southern
Sudan remains part of a united Sudan or secedes. In an e!ort to stimulate discussion of and
planning for the referendum and its aftermath, last year our two institutions—the United States
Institute of Peace and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael—each
conducted scenario development exercises designed to describe a few (by no means all) of the
potential scenarios in Sudan surrounding the referendum. One year later, we are revisiting those
scenarios to evaluate how they have held up and which ones appear most likely given recent
developments in Sudan.
Summarizing the Scenarios
USIP summarized three scenarios in the USIP Special Report, “Scenarios for Sudan: Avoiding Political
Violence Through 2011”1:
“Muddling Through”—With concerted effort, robust international engagement, and some
progress on key issues, the parties avoid large-scale violence. This requires collaboration
and compromise between the parties on several key issues, such as oil management and
revenue sharing.
JON TEMIN
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Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited
“Civil War, fr om Tinderbox to Conflagration”—The failure to build trust and address key
issues between the North and South prior to the referendum results in violence after the
referendum. A single incident, especially around Abyei or the oil fields, can trigger a return
to war.
"Costly Secession”—Without a change in its current capacity to govern, the South devolves
into a downward spiral of violence, even in the absence of aggression from the North or a
loss of existing donor support. The lack of a “peace dividend” at the grassroots is especially
disruptive.
On the basis of two key questions—“Will Sudan remain united or will the South secede?” and
“Will there be a renewed war between the North and South or can it be avoided?”—the Clingendael
Institute described four scenarios in its report, “Sudan 2012: Scenarios for the Future”2:
“The Last War Revisited?” (war & united)—Southern Sudan declares itself unilaterally independent.
Khartoum uses tribal discord to manage the rebellion and is able to control an
unstable, con"ict-ridden Southern Sudan. The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) splinter as a result of Khartoum’s divide and rule
strategy.
“Border Wars” (war & secession)—The South chooses independence in the referendum. This
choice is not acceptable to Khartoum, which decides to start a military o!ensive. The South
unites in the face of a common enemy and keeps the northern forces at bay. Subsequently,
the war continues, mainly in the border region. “Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Hurray!” (no war & united)—As a result of a renewed
mediation e!ort by the international community, the peace process is rejuvenated.
The elections are won by the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the northern
opposition, who subsequently form a coalition with the National Congress Party (NCP). This
new government starts a process of further democratization and redistribution of power
and income, so that most marginalized groups no longer need to take up arms against
Khartoum. Moreover, the atmosphere in Southern Sudan changes and the population
regains confidence in the unity of the country. “Be Careful What You Wish For: Somalia?” (no war & secession)—Even before the South
declares independence, various groups anticipate the coming redistribution of power.
In the North, the conflicts in Darfur and other regions intensify, while the South faces an
increasing number of tribal conflicts. After the referendum, in which the South chooses independence,
the balance of power is lost. The South splinters into smaller parts controlled
by various factions, while the North also loses its coherence.
The two scenario development exercises were conducted independently, using different
methodologies and participants3, but the similarities between some of the outcomes were striking.
Each included a scenario in which secession resulted in a new state in the South that is weak and
racked by internal violence (“Costly Secession” and “Be Careful What You Wish For: Somalia?”). Each
described a possible return to a North-South civil war, with fghting concentrated around the
North-South border (“Civil War, from Tinderbox to Con"agration” and “Border Wars”).
Both exercises also left little room for optimism. The best case USIP scenario is “Muddling
Through.” The most optimistic Clingendael scenario is “CPA Hurray!,” which was assessed as
plausible but unlikely. The USIP and Clingendael exercises both emphasized that Sudan’s future is
unlikely to be free of violence and con"ict, and both highlighted the need to negotiate key post-referendum
arrangements in advance of the referendum
Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited
The main di!erence between the exercises is that none of the USIP scenarios envisioned a vote
for unity, whereas two of the Clingendael scenarios (“CPA Hurray!” and “The Last War Revisited?”)
involve unity, both voluntary and forced. The prospect of southerners voting for unity seems even
less likely now than it did one year ago; the time remaining to make unity attractive is minimal, and
the unity campaign promised by the North after the April elections is just getting o! the ground.
Two of the Clingendael scenarios and all of the USIP scenarios envisioned the referendum
occurring on time. For all the dire warnings about a return to civil war in Sudan and the gloomy
scenarios envisioned by our organizations’ reports, it is worth recognizing that the CPA remains
intact and in effect. Over the past year, several issues and events could have led to the unraveling
of the CPA, including the disputed census, contentious legislation (including the Southern Sudan
Referendum Act, the Abyei Referendum Act and the National Security Act), and the recent nationwide
elections. None of these challenges were handled by the NCP and SPLM with particular grace
or subtlety (elite bargaining between the parties remains the norm), but all were managed and
widespread violence avoided. Of course, the referendum will be the ultimate test of the parties’
ability to collaborate and avoid disaster, in part because the SPLM has compromised in other areas
while clearly signaling that they will not compromise on the referendum.
Revisiting the USIP Scenarios
All three USIP scenarios seem plausible one year later. The “Civil War” scenario may be less likely
now that some of the possible seeds of political violence identiffed in that scenario—the census,
elections and referendum legislation—are in the past. But other possible triggers—such as oil
revenue sharing, border demarcation and citizenship—remain to be negotiated, with disagreement
over oil and revenue sharing possessing the greatest potential for instigating North-South
violence.
The “Costly Secession” scenario remains worryingly possible. The USIP report identified six
factors that could trigger large-scale political violence in the South:
���� failure to distribute food, water and power and build basic infrastructure (still a concern, as
there is little tangible “peace dividend” to speak of);
inter-tribal conflict (which has generally increased over the past year, though may have
decreased in recent months);
violence in Southern Kordofan or Blue Nile states (encouragingly, there has been relatively
little in the past year);
the GoSS’s inability to disarm militias (minimal progress made and some tensions exacerbated
by disarmament efforts);
lack of decentralization of power (only limited decentralization has occurred); and
the North’s failure to lend assistance to avoid violence in the South (there is no reason to
believe the North has worked to deter violence in the South).
All six factors still have the potential to destabilize the South.
Encouragingly, the “Muddling Through” scenario may be more likely now than one year ago. The
report identified five ingredients to building the confidence and stability essential to this scenario:
compromise on the census (which has occurred);
acceptance of election and referendum results (election results were not wholly accepted
but contestations have been muted; acceptance of the referendum results remains a massive
factor);
Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited
developing a shared vision of the future (little progress, though negotiations on post-referendum
arrangements may help);
reaching a negotiated settlement or other resolution concerning the status of the three areas
(the Permanent Court of Arbitration verdict on Abyei was largely accepted and legislation
governing the Abyei referendum and Popular Consultation processes passed, but how
those processes play out remains hugely in"uential); and
Darfur does not become a source of escalating violence (sadly violence has increased
signi#cantly in recent months).
That the “Muddling Through” scenario may be slightly more likely to occur than the other
scenarios is cause for cautious optimism.
Revisiting the Clingendael Scenarios
The two key questions in the Clingendael scenarios—whether the country remains one or the
South secedes, and whether there will be a return to war—remain relevant. Looking at the four
scenarios, all but one remain plausible.
If war cannot be avoided, the relative strength of the South and North, to a large extent,
determines whether “Border Wars” or “The Last War Revisited?” is more likely. If both parties remain
coherent and themselves in a relative power balance, the former scenario becomes more
likely. If the North has the upper hand and the South is unable to remain united, the latter scenario
becomes more likely.
The precondition for the “CPA Hurray!” scenario was free, fair and uncontested elections. This
condition was not met, making this the one scenario which is no longer plausible. In the original
report, however, an alternative scenario involving unity and no return to war was suggested: “Stagnation.”
In this scenario, elites in Khartoum and Juba have little to gain from a change in the status
quo and cooperate with each other. Sudanese and international actors carry on, continuing to
hold Sudan together and address problems in an ad hoc manner. Although the country is formally
still united, in the North, certain areas, such as Darfur, continue to rebel against Khartoum, while in
the South, marginalized areas increasingly resist and push back against Juba. Essentially, “Stagnation”
is not very di!erent from “Be Careful What You Wish For: Somalia?” Paradoxically, because
progress has been made over the past year towards a peaceful referendum and possible secession,
this latter scenario becomes more likely. This underlines the need to confront the formidable task
of managing internal con"icts in both the North and South.
Going Forward
It is late in coming, but there has been some encouraging recent progress in addressing a main
concern raised in the USIP and Clingendael reports regarding post-referendum arrangements. For
example, the NCP and SPLM signed a memorandum of understanding in late June that outlines
the structure of negotiations over post-referendum arrangements that began in July. They will
need to progress quickly, however, as the window for negotiations will be open for probably only
three or four months until the hype surrounding the referendum takes hold. The top of the list of
issues to be negotiated should be post-referendum oil sector management and revenue sharing.
Both reports emphasized the potential for increased South-South and North-North violence.
In addition to negotiating post-referendum arrangements, both the North and South need to
develop strategies to productively engage the opposition (armed and unarmed) and incorporate
marginalized ethnic and tribal groups into power structures, while decentralizing authority and
ABOUT THIS BRIEF
more equitably sharing resources. Both parties also need to refrain from supporting armed opposition
against each other. Strategies that pursue a union of the marginalized against Khartoum or a
divide and rule approach in the South have a good chance of back#ring and creating an uncontrollable
chaos.
Finally, the Southern leadership needs to develop a strategy for generating a stronger, broader
sense of cohesion and common purpose across the South. Much of what uni#es the South today
is the perceived common enemy in the North and the promise held by the referendum. Whether
the referendum results in secession or continuation of the CPA-style of governance featuring a
semi-autonomous GoSS, now is the time for an inclusive dialogue on the bonds that can be the
basis for stronger Southern cohesion.
Endnotes
1. http://www.usip.org/resources/scenarios-sudan-avoiding-political-violence-through-2011
2. http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/publications/?id=7626
3. The USIP exercise involved Sudan experts outside of Sudan, while the Clingendael workshops
were conducted in Sudan with Sudanese.
Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited
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